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One of the great challenges to Courts in civil claims is to award damages in
an appropriate manner which as far as possible places the plaintiff in the
position that he or she would be in but for the injury. The awarding of
appropriate damages to a person leading a part-subsistence village lifestyle
presents the Courts with a special challenge.
This article considers the attempts that the Courts in Papua New Guinea
have made to award appropriate damages to people living this lifestyle. The
article attempts to bring together the common principles that emerge through
the cases. It also outlines some of the important issues that still need to be
addressed by the Courts to ensure that the actual needs of plaintiffs living in
a village lifestyle are addressed.
I. NATURE OF DAMAGES
The award of damages by civil Courts in common law jurisdictions is the
most frequently used remedy imposed in civil actions, once civil liability has
been established against the civil wrongdoer. The defendant through the
payment of damages is required to compensate the plaintiff for the loss and
suffering that has occurred because of the civil wrong. Through the payment
of damages the defendant indemnifies himself or herself from the
responsibility for that wrong which is the result of his or her negligent
actions.
With the exception of exemplary damages the primary purpose of damages
is to compensate the plaintiff.1 Damages are not a compassionate payment.
The basic purpose of awarding damages is expressed in the Latin phrase
restitutio in integrum. Basically this means to restore to the former position.
The relevant application of this principle to the Papua New Guinea situation
was aptly expressed Miles J in the Kaka Kopun case, when he stated that the
purpose of damages is to place the plaintiff (as far as money can) in the
position that he or she would have been in but for the injury.2 What are the
implications of this? Basically, when a person suffers a serious personal
injury or the loss of a partner a major gap is created in the person’s life. This
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gap is significant because the person loses vital resources which allow that
person to function adequately and obtain a reasonable standard of living. In
the case of personal injury, if the plaintiff becomes paralysed he or she loses
mobility and independence, and life expectancy is greatly reduced. If the
plaintiff loses the use of an arm, then he or she is very limited in the
different manual tasks that are to be performed. If the plaintiff loses the use
of a leg, then his or her mobility and agility are greatly affected. If the
plaintiff loses the use of an eye, then the ability to perform certain tasks that
require reading and writing is greatly reduced. If, as the result of an accident,
the members of a family lose a husband and father they lose not only the
principal provider (this is especially the case in a village situation) but also
the person who gives important support, guidance and encouragement.
Clearly a gap is created in the plaintiff’s life, a gap which makes the
performance of essential life tasks very difficult. The gap has been created
by a civil wrong caused by the defendant. If justice is to be achieved then
this gap has to be filled. The method developed by the common law to fill
this gap is the award of monetary damages. Money will not restore lost
mobility, nor will it restore lost sight. Further, it will not bring to life a
person killed as the result of an accident. But it will give the plaintiff
resources to enable him or her to deal with the loss of mobility or sight.
Damages in the form of money will provide the surviving members of the
family of a husband and father killed in an accident with resources to
continue to live their life in a reasonable manner.
Damages form a part of the common law, which has been adopted in Papua
New Guinea by virtue of Schedule 2.2 of the Constitution. If damages are to
be an effective remedy to compensate the victim of a civil wrong, they must
be flexible and adapt to changing social and economic circumstances. As
Lord Denning has stated, the common law principles (which include
damages) need to be moulded and shaped to meet the social necessities and
social opinions of the present day.3 Kapi DCJ supports these observations of
Lord Denning when he states that the common law must be fluid and
progressive.4 The fluidity, adaptability and effectiveness of the common law
are especially tested in the efforts of the Courts to award damages in Papua
New Guinea to people living a traditional village part-subsistence lifestyle.
Such damages are claimed by people who receive an injury which greatly
inhibits their ability to function effectively in this life situation or who lose a
relative, husband, wife, father, mother, son or daughter whose contribution
to the village lifestyle was essential for the family.
3 Lord Denning, The Discipline of Law (1979).
4 The State v Bisket Uranquae Pokia [1980] PNGLR 97, 100.
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If the Courts are to achieve the goal of damages, which is to place the
plaintiff in the same position but for the accident, they must try to
understand the realities and hardships of living a traditional part-subsistence
lifestyle. The Courts must also appreciate the impact of a permanent injury,
with differing degrees of seriousness, on a person living in this situation, or
the impact of the death of a father, husband, mother, son or daughter on the
surviving family members in the village.
II. DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY
The effects of personal injury caused by an accident for which another party
is responsible are very serious. The true effect can only be determined by
analysing the plaintiff’s life-style and situation and how the permanent
injury of the hand arm, leg, spine or eye affects this. Once this has been
established, the common law if flexible can award appropriate damages. In
personal injury cases damages are awarded under two broad headings. These
are damages for pain and suffering and the negative impact that the injury
has on the plaintiff’s lifestyle, and the economic loss which has come about
as a result of the injury.5
1. Damages for Pain and Suffering and Negative Impact on Lifestyle
How is it best to describe the real-life situation of people living in a village?
Miles J provides a clear explanation in the Kaka Kopun case.6 According to
Miles J, people living a village lifestyle (in the 1980s) follow a part-
subsistence lifestyle. Part-subsistence means that people produce their own
food and collect firewood and other items to enable them to live a basic
lifestyle. Over and above this, there is the cash income gained from the sale
of vegetables and coffee, which are surplus to the subsistence needs of the
family. The cash obtained from the sale of these items is sufficient to satisfy
the minimum needs for clothing, transport and sundry items. Also, a family
has to fulfil its traditional obligations by contributing to bride-price
payments, compensation and moka exchanges.7 To be able effectively to
carry out a village lifestyle it is essential that a person is fit, has the full use
of hands, arms and legs, and is fully agile. Village life is very difficult. All
work is done manually on what is difficult terrain to manage and there are
5 Under these two headings fall interest, costs and the assessment of past and future
economic loss.
6 Supra note 2, at 560.
7 A moka exchange refers to a traditional exchange of pigs and other valued commodities
in the Western Highlands between clans which have certain traditional relationships and
obligations. The purpose of this exchange is to create and cement good relationships.
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also the uncertainties of flood, drought and frost. Further, there is the need to
respond to significant traditional obligations often without any warning. It is
for this reason that Miles J noted in the case of Kaka Kopun that the impact
of an injury on a person who depends upon his own labours to derive a
living from the land can be very severe indeed.8 This point iwa also
acknowledged by Prentice J in the Raquel case. He noted that a person who
is used to a full range of village activities, including hunting, gardening,
fishing, carrying of timbe, and house construction, would find that the loss
of the use of an arm or a leg could cause a more severe invasion of his life
than a similar loss to an urban dweller. This is because he would be less able
to cope with the hazards of nature, fire and flood and perform the activities
which are essential when living in a village.9
A survey of the cases would suggest that there are three types of negative
effects that a permanent personal injury can have on a person leading a
traditional village lifestyle. First, the loss of the use of limbs makes physical
work very difficult if not impossible depending on the seriousness of the
injury. A person living a part-subsistence traditional village lifestyle is
dependent upon the full use of his or her limbs. Through an injury a person
can partially or completely lose the use of the limbs. The effects that the
differing severity of injury has on a person’s lifestyle is revealed through the
different cases which deal with injuries of differing degrees of severity. In
the Kokonas Kandapak case, the plaintiff as the result of an accident lost the
use of his hand by 50 percent. The Judge took this as meaning that he would
be totally incapacitated for the first year of his injury but that over the next
four years he would be able to adapt his manual activities in a manner which
would enable him to function in a way which would not result in any
economic loss.10 More serious was the case of Kaka Kopun. As a result of an
injury to his left forearm and wrist the plaintiff was no longer able to grip
the handles of a spade or hold an axe. The person’s situation was aggravated
by the fact that as a boy he received an injury to his other hand as a result of
which he was not able to obtain its full use. This made manual work in the
village virtually impossible for him.11 The effect was even more severe in the
Seke Opa case. In this case a fit young village person with coffee gardens
and a young family to support received a severe head injury, an eye infection
resulting in blindness, total paralysis in one arm, partial paralysis of one leg,
and loss of ability to eat caused by decreased muscle power. The plaintiff
8 Supra note 2, at 559.
9 Tali Kaipeng Raquel v Smerdon, unreported, National Court Judgement, 1972/706.
10 Kokonas Kandpak v The Independent State of Papua New Guinea [1980] PNGLR 573.
11 Supra note 2.
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had become a virtual invalid.12 More tragic still was the Andak Kupil case.
As a result of a car accident the plaintiff was paralysed from the lumbar
curvature down. The result of this was that he lost the complete use of his
legs, was unable to control his urine or his faeces, and was bed-ridden even
finding it difficult to sit up.13
These four cases illustrate the differing degrees of severity of impact that an
injury has upon a person’s physical functioning. From not being able to hold
a spade to being completely bed-ridden, these injuries in differing degrees
all have a very negative effect upon a person’s life functioning and make it
very difficult, if not impossible, for a person to perform work obligations.
The victims are not able to clear the bush, turn the ground, dig the drains,
build and repair the house, manage the coffee gardens, or do any casual
work, and as a result would find it difficult to contribute to moka exchanges,
compensation and bride price payments. As Miles J noted, the effect is
devastating.14
A second negative effect of permanent personal injury is the loss of social
status and standing in the community. In accordance with custom, a village
person (especially in the Highlands) gains his or her identity from two
activities. The first is being able to work the soil and use the natural
materials in the surroundings to secure an adequate standard of living for
one’s family. Secondly, identity is gained through being able to fulfil one’s
traditional obligations to the clan. This includes contributing to moka, bride
price and compensation payments, and taking an active part in traditional
ceremonies.
What is the effect of this inability to perform the two activities for the
plaintiff? Miles J in the Kaka Kopun case best describes this. The injury to
the plaintiff’s hand, aggravated by a pre-existing disability to his other hand,
meant that the plaintiff could not work in the gardens, do any work on his
house or even be able to cook for himself. This reduced the plaintiff to a
person of no standing in the community. This was because he was unable to
respond to community demands of brideprice, compensation payments and
moka exchange.15 Such failure gives a person a sense of shame. A village
person’s sense of identity is undermined. Identity comes from being able to
work the ground and from feeling a part of one’s community. To feel a part
12 Seke Opa v The Independent State of Papua New Guinea [1987] PNGLR 469.
13 Aundak Kupil and Kauke Kensi v The Independent State of Papua New Guinea [1983]
PNGLR 350.
14 Supra note 2, at 559.
15 Ibid, 561.
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of a community one must be able to contribute to it. One of the implications
of this loss of sense of identity is that village people tend to sit around the
village feeling very depressed and having no motivation.16 This is quite
understandable in that they have lost their sense of identity and fear that any
further activity will only aggravate the injury. They lack will-power,
motivation and initiative. There is a lack of rehabilitation facilities and
programmes in the villages and in the country generally which are enjoyed
by people in the same position in other countries. This means that the award
of damages must aim to fill a larger gap in these circumstances than in
comparative situations overseas or even in urban situations in Papua New
Guinea.
A third negative effect of permanent personal injury is that a plaintiff’s
marriage prospects can be significantly undermined. A crucial quality that a
woman is looking for in a marriage partner is a person who is able to do all
of the work in the village situation. In the Kaka Kopun case, the Court
acknowledged that the plaintiff’s marriage prospects were greatly
undermined because of the injury suffered.17 In the Seke Opa case, the
plaintiff was an energetic young village person with a young family and
became a virtual invalid because of the injury. His wife had to assume a
great many extra activities, virtually doing the work of two people. She
complained about being overworked and having to work around a husband
who was always depressed with no motivation made life very difficult for
her.18 In the Pangia Toea case, the female plaintiff had as the result of an
accident lost the full use of her left arm and 70 percent of the use of her left
leg, with the leg also being vulnerable to infection. One of the unfortunate
consequences of this accident was the break-up of the plaintiff’s marriage.
Los J noted that as a result of the injuries inflicted by the accident the
husband did not like her. The reason for this was that she could no longer be
a wife and mother as expected in the tough village life where she was
required to garden, carry heavy loads and feed many close and distant
relatives of her own and her husband. In short ,she was no longer able to
fulfil her traditional obligations.19
The reactions of the spouses to their partners’ injuries certainly appear harsh
and extreme. However, when one considers the difficulty of village life and
the need for the husband and wife to perform complementary work roles, the
16 Anis Wambia v The Independent State of Papua New Guinea [1980] PNGLR 567.
17 Supra note 2, at 565.
18 Supra note 12.
19 Pangis Toea v Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust and The Independent State of
Papua New Guinea [1986] PNGLR 294, 299.
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reaction can be understood. The co-operative performance of
complementary work-roles in accordance with custom is the key to a
successful highlands’ marriage.20 The performance of complementary roles
enables the couple to obtain an adequate subsistence existence for
themselves and their families as well as being able to contribute to their
traditional obligations. The failure or inability on the part of one of the
parties to perform his or her role places unexpected and unreasonable
demands upon the other party. What is already a hard and demanding
lifestyle becomes even more so. Practicality and survival by necessity must
be given priority. While traditionally the extended family is supposed to
assist, in reality this often does not occur.21
Thus, the effects of an injury upon a village person performing a traditional
lifestyle can be very severe indeed. It is evident that, in some cases, the
impact of the injury to a person living a traditional part-subsistence village
lifestyle is more severe than a person living in an urban or some other
situation in which he or she is able to enjoy the modern amenities of life.
The Courts need to take this added severity experienced by a village person
into account when determining the assessment of damages. This is not being
patronistic but rather acknowledges the point made by Miles J in the Koko
Kopun case that methods of awarding damages in industrialised countries
may not be appropriate for Papua New Guinea.22 Further, the Courts need to
be careful when using the damages awarded to injured expatriates as a guide
to determining the appropriate amount of damages for the pain and suffering
and negative impact of lifestyle on a traditional village person. Damages
must be fair and have full regard to the living standards and situation of such
people.
The danger of using damages awarded to an expatriate as a guide to those
which are awarded to a village person is revealed in the Andak Kupil case.
The plaintiff was totally and permanently paralysed. In determining the
appropriate damages for pain and suffering, Bredmeyer J was strongly
influenced by the Kerr case.23 Allowing for inflation, Bredmeyer J was of
the opinion that the award of damages for pain and suffering for Kerr would
have been K75,000. While Kerr was paralysed, he was able to return to
20 This point has been strongly emphasised by writers such as Strathern. Feelings of
affection come about as the result of the couple working together co-operatively over a
number of years.
21 This is because the extended use family is continually having to cope with many other
demands on its resources and services.
22 Supra note 2, at 561.
23 Kerr v Motor Vehicle Insurance (PNG) Trust Ltd (1979) PNGLR 251.
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Australia. Here, through the assistance of an effective rehabilitation
programme, he was able to shower and dress himself, take responsibility for
his own evacuations, use a wheel chair, drive a vehicle, and maintain a
clerical job. In comparing Kupil’s situation with that of Kerr’s, Bredmeyer J
noted that Kupil’s situation was far more serious because Kupil was
permanently bedridden, could not use a wheelchair and had continual bed
sores. For that reason Bredmeyer J made an award of damages for pain and
suffering of K90,000.00. The significant point here is that in comparing the
situation of Kupil with that of Kerr, Bredmeyer J took into account only
physical pain and discomfort. He did not acknowledge nor take into account
the added severity that paralysis would have on Kupil as a villager and the
fact that he would no longer be able to do any kind of work and that his
identity had been undermined.24
The Kupil case needs to be compared with that of Kaka Kopun, where Miles
J did acknowledge the severity of a serious injury on a villager’s life and
social status in the village.In acknowledging the impact of this injury both
physically and socially, Miles J decided that it was necessary to award a
substantial sum of damages for pain and suffering and the negative impact
of the injury on a plaintiff’s lifestyle. He saw this award of a considerable
sum as providing the plaintiff with some working capital to rehabilitate his
coffee garden and buy himself back into the favour of his people within the
village. The villagers would then see that he was tending to his coffee
garden through paid labour which he supervised and was therefore once
again able to respond to community obligations.25
Thus, the award of damages for pain and suffering to a person living a
traditional village lifestyle should focus on two factors. These are, first, the
severe impact of an injury upon a village person who relies upon the use of
his or her hands and legs for manual work, and, secondly, the fact that
damages should provide the plaintiff with some working capital to buy his
or her way back into favour with the community. Through acknowledging
these two factors in the assessment of damages, the Courts would show a
genuine understanding of the reality of the life situation of a village person.
2. Damages for Economic Loss
Under this head the Court includes damages relating to loss of income which
is the direct result of the injury, medical expenses (past and future), and
costs relating to any items which have to be purchased because of the injury.
24 Supra note 13, at 373.
25 Supra note 2.
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When considering the question of economic loss to a village person, the
issue which creates difficulty is that of income. How can this be determined?
Here we are referring to a person who gains some income from the sale of
vegetables and coffee over and above what that person and his or her family
need to retain for their subsistence needs.
In determining the loss of income derived from coffee in the Kaka Kopun
and Seke Opa cases, counsel for the plaintiffs called coffee experts as
witnesses. In the Seke Opa case, which was heard a number of years after
the accident had occurred, the expert witness was able to indicate how much
the coffee income had been reduced as the result of the plaintiff’s inability to
tend and maintain the garden.26 In the Kaka Kopun case, the Court
considered both the loss of coffee income and food production (for
consumption and sale). The combined loss was assessed at K30.00 per week
(in 1980). Here Miles J took into account the full impact of the loss of
income resulting from the plaintiff being unable to work in the garden. If
because of an injury a person cannot produce food for his or her
consumption, it is necessary to purchase the food, hence the importance of
damages being assessed appropriately.27
In the Pangis Toea case, Los J considered every aspect of the plaintiff’s pre-
accident economic situation. The plaintiff had assisted her husband in the
coffee garden. Because of this, whenever the husband sold the coffee he
would give the plaintiff K20.00. After carefully considering the evidence,
Los J decided that this should be taken into account as loss of income and
valued the loss at K80.00 per year.28
These cases reveal the lengths to which Judges have gone to ensure that all
assessable lost income, being the result of the injury, is acknowledged and
provided for in the award of damages. However, to ensure that every
relevant factor is taken into account with regard to economic loss suffered
by the plaintiff, Miles J and Bredmeyer J developed in their assessment of
the award of damages three principles. These are to ensure not only that
every relevant factor is provided for in the award, but that the award is
tailored in such a manner as to ensure that the needs of the plaintiff are
provided for in the most appropriate manner.
The first principle is the acknowledgment of the loss of earning capacity
which comes about as the result of the injury. According to Miles J, once a
26 Supra note 12, at 471.
27 Supra note 2, at 563.
28 Supra note 19, at 479.
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loss of earning capacity is established, even if there is no evidence as to pre-
and post-accident potential earnings, a trial Judge must in general assess and
award some compensation in this regard.29 How is earning capacity to be
assessed? In the Kokonas Kandapak case, Miles J again said that the Court
has to do its best to quantify the loss even if the evidence does not enable it
to be satisfied as to an exact figure. A Judge may use local knowledge,
imperfect as it may be, of things such as wage rates market prices.30
Woods J adopted Miles J’s reasoning in the Make Kewe case.31 In this case
the plaintiff was injured in a car accident. The injuries were spinal and
affected both his back and his legs. These injuries had a significant effect on
his ability to perform his normal village work and activities. In determining
the award of damages for economic loss, Woods J following the precedent
set by Miles J was prepared to take account of two factors. First, he was
prepared to place some value on the plaintiffs’ role and work as a villager.
Secondly, he was prepared to take account of the fact that because of the
injury the plaintiff could no longer get a casual labourer’s job.32 In other
words, Woods J was noting the earning capacity which had been lost as a
result of injury.
Why should Courts take into account the loss of earning capacity? Careful
consideration of the matter reveals that this is completely in line with the
underlying principle of the award of damages which is to place the plaintiff
in the situation that the plaintiff would have been in but for the injury.
Before the accident giving rise to the injury, a plaintiff would have been able
to take advantage of the part-time labouring opportunities as they arise.
Because of the injury he is no longer able to take advantage of this. It is just
and proper that this should be taken into account in the award of damages. I
suggest that this principle of earning capacity should be applied when
determining the economic loss resulting from the loss of production of a
plaintiff’s coffee garden. The Judge should consider if the garden can be
extended and developed and the production improved. If so, this would no
longer be possible because of the injury incurred by the plaintiff.
In the Seke Opa case, where the accident made the plaintiff into a virtual
invalid, the plaintiff was no longer able to maintain or develop the coffee
garden. The expert evidence called to assess the economic loss determined
that the production would gradually decrease and that after 10 years’
29 Supra note 2.
30 Supra note 10, at 472.
31 Make Kewe v Kudip Independent State of Papua New Guinea [1986] PNGLR 279.
32 Ibid, 281.
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production would cease. The Court followed this evidence in determining
damages for economic loss. No account was taken of earning capacity. Yet,
in another section of the judgment, the point was made that prior to the
accident the plaintiff was a healthy, hardworking young person in his early
twenties with a good opportunity to extend what appeared to be a prosperous
coffee garden.33 The key phrase here was “opportunity to extend”. Is this not
earning capacity? Should this not be taken into account in the award of
damages? Given the picture painted of the plaintiff as a keen energetic
young villager could not it be inferred that but for the accident he would
have extended and developed the garden? Is the Court not supposed to take
the plaintiff as it finds the plaintiff? It can be argued therefore that there
remains scope for the Courts to develop the extent of the principle of earning
capacity further.
The second principle or tool was developed by Bredmeyer J in the Kupil
case. Both of the plaintiffs thad been paralysed and bed-ridden as the result
of the accident. After awarding considerable damages for pain and suffering
and the negative impact of the injury on the plaintiffs’ lifestyle, Bredmeyer J
then proceeded to determine appropriate damages for economic loss. One
important factor which Bredmeyer J saw to be relevant was that neither
plaintiff could contribute to the manual tasks in the village which were
traditionally the work of the male. Bredmeyer J was of the opinion that there
needed to be compensation for this loss of labour. The method of providing
this compensation was both innovative and appropriate. He chose to allow
for funds in the award of damages to employ a labourer to do the manual
work which the plaintiffs could no longer do. This allowance was assessed
at K15.00 per week which was at the time of the judgement the current rate
for the hiring of a labourer.
It would be good to use this method of award in the situations of people who
are injured and who are no longer able to tend to their gardens. To village
people, their coffee and other gardens are central to their being. They have
put much time, energy and resources into developing these gardens. This
method if used properly is able to compensate for not only the loss of
production and income but also of earning capacity. Provision for the hiring
of a labourer would enable the gardens which the plaintiff has worked so
hard to develop to be maintained and even extended, and the injured plaintiff
would be able to see the fruits of his labour and be able to respond in some
way to traditional obligations through money earned from produce.
33 Supra note 12, at 472.
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The third principle which has been developed to assist in the assessment for
the award of damages in injury cases is to allow for gradual improvement of
a plaintiff’s functioning if it is appropriate to do so. Obviously this would
only be appropriate in cases where a plaintiff has received partial loss in one
arm, hand or leg. Miles J developed this idea in the Kokonas Kandpak case.
Here the plaintiff lost the use of his right hand to the extent of 50 percent.
The other limbs were functioning normally. Miles J decided that the injury
would have an effect on earning capacity in the following way. For the first
year after the injury the plaintiff would be totally incapacitated. For the
second year the plaintiff would regain his earning capacity by a third. In the
next three years the earning capacity would be a half. No further allowance
was made for loss. The reasoning behind Miles J's award here was that, if
the loss of the use of the hand was only partial and the other hand was
functioning normally, over time the plaintiff would be able to adapt his work
methods to cope with this partial loss. As this adaptation occurred he would
also gain more confidence. The award ordered by Miles J gave the plaintiff
plenty of time to do this.34
Thus, the Courts have been prepared to place an economic value on the
plaintiff’s work as a villager; take into account the loss of earning capacity;
and make provision for the hiring of a labourer to do the manual work which
the plaintiff is no longer able to undertake (especially in the gardens). In this
way, the Courts have made significant efforts to award damages which can
best place the plaintiff in the same position that the plaintiff would have
been in but for the accident leading to the injury.
III. DAMAGES FOR DEATH
The death of a person as the result of an accident has a severe impact on the
deceased’s surviving family members. The surviving spouse becomes the
plaintiff and the Court has the very difficult task of assessing and awarding
damages in a way that can place the plaintiff and her children, as far as
money can, in the same position as they would have been had the death not
occurred. The death of a person with surviving dependants living a
traditional village lifestyle faces the court with a real challenge to determine
appropriate damages.
When considering damages awarded for death arising out of a civil wrong it
is again important to emphasise the point that the purpose of damages is
34 Supra note 10, at 577.
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compensatory and is not a compassionate payment.35 The compensatory
emphasis of damages even in the case of death is emphasised by Bredmeyer
J in the Mave Koko case.36 In this case, damages had to be assessed for two
children for the loss of their mother in a motor vehicle accident.37 Bredmeyer
J started his judgment by saying that, in a dependency claim for the loss of a
mother, no damages are payable for the loss of their mother’s love and
affection nor for the grief that they suffered.38 He said that damages are
awarded for the pecuniary benefit that the children might have expected to
enjoy had their mother not been killed. This may seem to be harsh but those
people who have contributed to the development of principles governing the
awards of damages over the years have not felt it necessary to allow
damages for grief in the case of death. However, it could be argued that this
forms a definite contrast with the damages that are awarded in personal
injury cases for pain and suffering and the negative impact of the injury on a
plaintiff’s lifestyle. There is also a direct contrast with damages that are
awarded for breach of contract, which may include distress and frustration.
1. Domestic Support Claims
The Courts in Papua New Guinea, when awarding damages for the death of
a father and husband living a traditional village lifestyle, have developed the
principle of domestic paternal support. This principle, while not departing
from the general principle of damages, allows the Court to take into account
the loss of the emotional support of a husband and father to a family which
comes about as the result of a death. This principle was developed by Amet
J (as he was then) in the Pike Dambe case.39 In this case the plaintiff’s
husband had been shot by a policeman during a police operation in the
deceased’s area. Amet J found the killing to be unjustified and the State
liable for damages. The plaintiff claimed general damages, damages for
economic loss, exemplary damages and interest thereon, plus the cost of the
proceedings. For the purpose of this article, the award of general damages
and damages for economic loss and the method of award are of interest.
35 The one exception to this is the payment of solatium to the parents for the loss of a child
(provided for in the Wrongs (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, Chapter 297, s 29).
36 Mave Koko v Motor Vehicles Insurance Trust [1983] PNGLR 167.
37 The father was not able to bring a claim because it was his negligent driving which was
responsible for the accident.
38 As to the award of damages in breach of contract for mental distress, frustration or
upset, see Harding v Teeroi Timbers Pty Ltd [1988] PNGLR 128.
39 Pike Dambe v Augustine Peri and The Independent State of Papua New Guinea [1993]
PNGLR 4, 12.
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In the Dambe case, the lifestyle followed by the deceased and his family fell
into Miles J’s description of a part-subsistence villager. He and the plaintiff
planted kaukau and vegetable plus a reasonably sized coffee garden, which
provided them with a shared income of K800.00 per year. The Judge
acknowledged that the deceased had performed all of the manly physical
work and that the fact that he could no longer provide this would
significantly reduce the production of the gardens and the subsequent
income. Having acknowledged this, the Judge awarded damages for
economic loss of only K300.00 per year, which was less than half of the
total income. The assessment of economic loss here was difficult because
the surviving wife would still gain some income albeit a substantially
reduced income. How big was the reduction? An expert witness who was
from the Hagen area made the observation that, in a traditional village
situation where the husband and wife co-operatively performed their
complementary roles in the garden, the production would be more than
double that which the individual partners could produce themselves. The
fact that the joint work of the partners would be more than double that of an
individual contribution should mean that the award of damages for
economic loss in a situation such as this where the husband is killed should
be just over a half of the amount that was earned jointly by the husband and
wife.
As already noted, in his award of damages in the Dambe case, Amet J went
further than just acknowledging economic loss. He gave recognition that the
loss of the family through the death of a husband and father was a loss of
both the tangible and the intangible. He brought all of this under the heading
of domestic paternal support. This included three forms of support given by
a husband and a father to his family in a traditional village situation. First,
there were the heavy manual tasks. These included clearing the ground and
turning the earth in preparation for both subsistence and cash cropping,
digging of drains, and building and maintaining the family house. Secondly,
there was the physical, practical and emotional support that a husband and
father gave to a family living a traditional lifestyle. Thirdly, the man ensured
that the family fulfilled the traditional obligations to its clan and community
in exchanges which included bride price, compensation and moka exchange.
In so doing the man ensured that the family felt part of the community.40
It was only proper that the Court acknowledged the significant loss of the
husband and father. The Court was not awarding damages for grief or
consolation but was compensating for the loss of practical and emotional
support. How was this acknowledged? The Court made an award of K14.00
40 Ibid, 11.
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per week. K5.00 went to the mother and this was awarded until she reached
the age of 55. The remainder was divided evenly amongst the children
(K3.00 per week) up until each child reached the age of 18. While this might
not seem to be a large amount it needs to be remembered that in this case
exemplary damages were awarded to the value of K30,000. It is true that the
award of exemplary damages should not influence the amounts of other
damages. However, the Court does have to ensure that the plaintiff is not
unjustly enriched. The award of exemplary damages would therefore have
had an indirect influence on the amount of damages for domestic paternal
support. In this case the usual award of K1,500.00 was made for the loss of
expectation of life.41
Woods J gave support to the principle developed by Amet J in the Seni Eli
case. The plaintiff was the widow of a person killed in a motor vehicle
accident. At the time of the death the couple had a child aged five. The
deceased was a village person. He cultivated traditional crops and some
coffee and was the sole supporter of the plaintiff and the child. The yearly
income from the coffee was estimated to be K350.00 and that from
vegetables was K50.00. Amet J, noting that this was a co-operative effort,
made an allowance for the reduction of coffee and income brought about
through the death of the deceased. He also made an allowance for the other
work which the deceased did for the family and which could not be given an
exact cash figure, namely, the construction of gardens and fences and the
construction and maintenance of the family home. In converting all of this
into a cash figure, Woods J allowed K5.50 per week for the plaintiff until
she reached the age of 55 and K5.50 per week for the daughter until she
reached the age of 18.42
The principle of domestic paternal support is an innovative development in
the principles governing the award of damages and is a principle which
accords well with the support given by a husband and father in a traditional
village situation.
Bredmeyer J addressed the issue of domestic maternal support in relation to
an urban situation in the Koko case. In this case he provided a clear
framework which would allow sufficient latitude for the Court to award
damages for the loss of domestic maternal support in an appropriate case. In
41 In common law jurisdictions it is usual for the Courts to set a fixed amount for the loss
of expectation of life. Up until 1994, the amount that was established and followed was
K1,500. However, in 1994, the Supreme Court in the case of Wallbank v Papua New
Guinea [1994] PNGLR 88 increased the amount to K3,000.00.
42 Seni Eli v The Independent State of Papua New Guinea [1988-89] PNGLR 653.
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the Koko case, two children lost their mother in a motor vehicle accident.
Bredmeyer J, after a careful survey of relevant cases, decided that it was
possible to award damages for the cost of replacing the services of a mother
by a housekeeper, the extra services provided by a mother (such as essential
matters to do with upbringing and help with homework), and the increased
risk of orphanhood. This approach acknowledged the special vulnerability of
a child when losing his or her mother. This was because there was the risk
that the father might not be able to perform fully the parenting duties. This
might occur because of the premature death of the father or the lack of
money due to illness or unemployment.43
Woods J, in the Nolnga case, applied the principles established in the Koko
case to a village lifestyle situation. A mother from the Jimi valley in the
Western Highlands was killed in an accident. Surviving her was the husband
and three children aged 10, 9 and 4 years of age. While at the time of the
Court decision the oldest child was 19, she was only 14 at the time of the
accident and therefore a dependent. The younger children since the accident
were being looked after by the plaintiff’s mother (their grandmother) in the
village. She was fulfilling the housekeeping-type work as well as trying to
be a mother to them. Following the precedent established in the Koko case,
Woods J allowed for a payment to each child of K3.50 per week, to be
calculated from the time of the accident causing the mother’s death until
they reached the age of 18. As the two older children were 19 and 16
respectively at the time of the judgment, Woods J saw no justification for
making any further award to them under the head of the increased risk of
orphanhood. However for the youngest child who was only four at the time
of the accident he held that an award under this head was proper. He
therefore proceeded to award K1,000 to the youngest child, which was the
same amount that was awarded to the oldest child in the Koko case. The
Nolnga case was a start but the principle could be developed further so that
the head of damages can properly called domestic maternal support. This
would include the total support given by a wife and mother to the whole
family in a traditional village situation.44
The co-operative work of the partners has been discussed. The loss of one
partner creates a gap. Amet J, in the Dambe case, made the point that, while
by custom the deceased relatives should help the surviving widow, they are
reluctant as they have their own families and gardens to nurture.45 People are
quick to criticise this lack of help. In reality, immediately after the death of
43 Supra note 36, at 168.
44 Nolnga v Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust (1991) PNGLR ?.
45 Supra note 39, at 12.
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the deceased, the relatives or extended family are very supportive. However,
as time passes, there are new events, situations and obligations which arise
requiring immediate attention and diverting the focus away from the needs
of the widow. There may be tribal fights or tensions, compensation
demands, bride price and moka exchanges to contribute to, unexpected
floods, droughts or raids by the police destroying large parts of people’s
livelihood. In a village situation people have many conflicting demands for
their time and resources. The most immediate demands tend to take
precedence. The widow with three children does not receive priority
attention. However because of the reasons outlined it is unfair to be critical
of relatives.
2. Dependency Claims on Death of Child
Three cases illustrate claims for damages arising out of the death of a child
in traditional village situations. In each case a claim was brought by a parent
whose child was killed through a civil wrong and who provided support to
the parents or, had they not been killed, would have provided significant
economic support. In the Mina Uokare case, a claim was made by the
parents of an 18-year-old son who was killed in a motor vehicle accident.
The parents maintained that they relied on their son for support. The son was
living a traditional village lifestyle and at the same time of his death was
giving significant support to the plaintiffs. While there were other children,
the deceased was the main support-giver. The parents were 45 at the time of
the death. The Judge acknowledged that the loss of support was significant
and that the parents would have increasingly relied on the son’s support as
they grew older. He made a K2.00 per week allowance for the loss of
support for the next 20 years which he took to be their life expectancy.46 A
similar claim was made in the Helen case. In this case the deceased was shot
dead by the Station Commander of the Wabag police station without any
apparent reason. The plaintiff, who was the step-mother of the deceased
claimed damages for loss of support. Again the Court acknowledged this
loss and that the need for support would increase as the plaintiff and her
husband grew older.47 In this case the Judge awarded damages for the loss of
support to the value of K5.00 per week for twenty years which the court
took to be their life expectancy.48 In the Simin Dingi case, the Court went so
far as to take into account under the head of loss of earning capacity the loss
of potential bride-price to the parents of a teenage daughter who was killed
46 Mina Uokare v The Independent State of Papua New Guinea [1988-89] PNGLR 655,
656.
47 Ibid, 394.
48 Helen v Jack Marius Karani and The State [1992] PNGLR 391.
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in a road accident in the Chimbu. But for the death resulting from an
accident which was brought about by a negligent act, the plaintiff could have
expected the bride-price payment for his daughter. Woods J therefore saw
that it was proper to take the bride-price into account for the award of
damages. He was guided in his assessment of damages by the average bride-
price paid in the Gumine area of Chimbu.49
The willingness of the Court to award damages for the loss of support of a
child acknowledges the importance given to family obligations in
Melanesian Society. As parents grow older they rely upon their child more
for support. The death of a child brought about through a civil wrong means
that the parents are unable to rely upon that support. It is only fair and just
that the defendant should have to compensate for this loss of support for
which he or she is responsible.
3. Claims for Reasonable Funeral Costs
Under the Wrongs (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, the Court is able to
award costs in favour of the plaintiff for reasonable funeral costs in cases
where the death of a person has been the result of a civil wrong.50 In Papua
New Guinea, when a death occurs there are many traditional obligations
which must be fulfilled in accordance with the custom of a particular area. In
the Inabari case, the issue of awarding funeral costs was considered and
whether or not this could include traditional obligations. Salika J noted that
in Papua New Guinea generally the event of a death is regarded as a major
occasion. The length of the period of mourning and the number of mourners
often depends upon the status of the person who has died. It is the task of the
deceased’s immediate relatives to provide for the mourners for as long as the
mourning period extends. This in practical terms can be an expensive
exercise. The costs also include ceremonies and other gatherings which
occur after the funeral. In this particular case the deceased was a child from
Dagua in the East Sepik. There the mourning period usually extends for two
weeks. The deceased’s parents had to provide food for the mourners for this
period of time. The issue that the Judge had to consider was whether
reasonable funeral costs could include traditional obligations associated
directly with the death, and costs which were incurred after the burial but
still related to the mourning. The Judge decided that they could and was
prepared to include as reasonable funeral expenses the cost of the food for
49 Simin Dingi v Motor Vehicles Insurance Trust [1994] PNGLR 385.
50 Wrongs (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, chapter 297, s 28 (2).
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feeding the mourners for two weeks, telephone calls to inform people about
the death, and the cost of a vehicle to take the deceased body to the village.51
IV. PERIODIC PAYMENT AWARDS
Under the present common law principles regarding the awarding of
damages, once the amount of damages has been assessed and determined,
they are awarded to the plaintiff in a lump sum and (barring appeal) this is
the end of the matter so far as the court is concerned. The Court is not
concerned with how the damage money is spent and there is no safeguard to
ensure that it will be spent on rehabilitating the plaintiff and supporting his
family.52 In a way this undermines the central purpose of damages which is
to place the plaintiff in the same position that he or she would have been in
but for the injury or but for the death of the spouse. There are other
difficulties that may arise. After the judgment it may be realised that there
was a mistake in the assessment of damages and the medical costs were
greater than anticipated. Similarly, while damages might be awarded on the
basis (following medical opinion and evidence) that the plaintiff would live
another three years, he might live another ten years and this extra seven
years is not provided for in the damages. However, the original award of
damages stands.
In the Kupil case, the difficulties surrounding the award of damages were
considered in some detail by Bredmeyer J.53 He quoted a report written by a
Commission in Australia on this very matter. Amongst other points, it
suggested that damage awards for future economic loss and medical needs
should be awarded on a periodic basis. It was this suggestion that clearly
influenced Bredmeyer J to decide to initiate an innovative idea for the award
of damages. The award of damages for pain and suffering, loss of
expectation of life, past economic loss and the associated interest were by
way of the traditional lump-sum. However, for the awards of damages
relating to future economic loss and medical needs, Bredmeyer J chose to
order these to be paid at a set amount each fortnight. His authority to make
such an order came from section 155 (4) of the Constitution. This section
reads:
51 Inabari v Sapat and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea [1991] PNGLR 427.
52 Bredmeyer J made this point strongly in the Kupil case, supra note 13.
53 Ibid, 383.
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Both the Supreme Court and National Court have an inherent power to make, in
such circumstances as seem to them proper, orders in the nature of prerogative writs
and such other orders as are necessary to do justice to a particular case.54
According to Bredmeyer J, the purpose of this section was to enable the
Courts to tailor their remedies to meet the circumstances of the particular
case and so ensure that justice was done. Bredmeyer J felt that in this
particular case it was in the interests of justice to order damages for future
economic loss and medical expenses to be paid on a fortnightly basis. The
reason for this was that both of the plaintiffs had been seriously paralysed.
Their life expectancy was estimated to be only five years.55 However it was
possible that they might live longer. Should the Court award damages for
future economic loss in a lump sum assessed on a life expectancy of five
years, and then the plaintiffs lived for ten years, there would be no provision
for that extra five years. The fortnightly order would, however, ensure that
the plaintiffs received a regular payment for the duration of their remaining
life.
Woods J adopted the approach of Bredmeyer J in the John Taka case. Again
the plaintiff was a village person who had been permanently paralysed and
so required the continual assistance of others for all of his needs. Woods J
was of the opinion that the Court had a responsibility to consider the future
needs of the plaintiff and to make an appropriate order to ensure that he was
guaranteed a regular payment to cover his difficulties and need for continual
care. It was noted that for most people in Papua New Guinea (including the
plaintiff) there was no effective system in place to manage large sums of
money in a way that fully protected their future interests. Because of this,
Woods J followed the precedent set by Bredmeyer J and used the authority
given to him under section 155 (4) of the Constitution. He ordered that the
plaintiff’s damages for future economic loss and need for future care should
be awarded in a fortnightly amount which was assessed at K70.00 per week
and was to be paid for the duration of the plaintiff’s natural life.56
54 Constitution of Papua New Guinea, s 155(4).
55 Supra note 13, at 384-385.
56 John Taka v Leo Kipi and The State [1995] PNGLR 254, 257. Neither Woods J nor
Bredmeyer J saw any difficulty in giving effect to the order. Woods J was of the
opinion that the fortnightly payments could be incorporated through the Department of
the Attorney-General onto the Government pay-roll system and paid through a bank
account in the name of the plaintiff. It would then be up to the Solicitor-General to
track the life of the plaintiff and be advised of his eventual demise in the future.
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This method of awarding damages for future economic loss and medical
needs is appropriate for the Papua New Guinea village situation, for two
reasons. First, the criticisms made regarding the awards paid in lump sums
are acknowledged. Secondly, in a Papua New Guinea village situation, when
a person receives in one payment a large amount of money there is pressure
from a person’s relatives to distribute that money to acknowledge the
different assistance given or to acknowledge certain relationships. In reality
the plaintiff may receive very little of the amount that was awarded to him
or her. However, relatives seeing the ongoing needs of the plaintiff would
more readily be able to appreciate that the payment of the modest but regular
sum of money is for the purpose of tending to the plaintiff’s ongoing needs.
The use of the periodic payment for future economic loss and medical needs
is another development made by the Courts to ensure that the award of
damages to a person living a traditional lifestyle is effective and appropriate.
The damages for pain and suffering and the negative impact of the injury on
the plaintiff’s lifestyle would still be awarded in a lump sum. This would
still enable the plaintiff to use this lump sum as working capital to
rehabilitate coffee gardens and regain respect in the community.
It is unfortunate that the principle of periodic payments has not been
developed further by other members of the judiciary. Given the continual
traditional demands on people who receive large amounts of money by their
relatives, it is necessary to provide some protection to the injured party or
surviving family members of the deceased by using the power given to the
courts under section 155(4) of the Constitution. The use of this section could
be extended even further to create a trust whereby trustees would be
responsible for administering the money for the best interests of the
beneficiary. Respected members of the community, such as a priest, a pastor
and an educated community leader, could be appointed as trustees. They
would have the responsibility of dealing with the demands from relatives
and, while acknowledging these, would also ensure that the money was used
to support the plaintiff in the way that it was intended. It would be necessary
to gain the approval of the plaintiff, for such a proposal to be given effect.
He or she might not be interested in the proposal. It is however a possible
further development in ensuring that damages are awarded appropriately.
V. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMON LAW DAMAGES
AND CUSTOMARY COMPENSATION
Occasionally the Courts are required to consider what should be done in a
situation where, prior to the award of damages, the plaintiff also received
some compensation from the clan of the person responsible for the civil
wrong. This happened in the Kupil case. The vehicle in which the accident
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occurred was owned by the State. The driver was an employee of the State.
However, the driver was also a member of a clan having a close relationship
with both plaintiffs and the accident occurred in that area. The result of this
was that the clan of the driver made a compensation payment to the clan of
the plaintiffs. To each of the two plaintiffs a separate compensation payment
was made of K2, 400.00, forty pigs and two muruks. Each plaintiff then
distributed a considerable amount of this compensation to their clan
members in accordance with local custom. They kept for themselves and
their families the cash of K2, 400.00.57
Bredmeyer J had to determine what effect the compensation payment should
have on the damages. To assist him in this, expert witnesses were called to
explain the purpose of compensation in the Wahgi area. He was also guided
by schedule 2.1 of the Constitution and sections 3 and 5 of the Customs
Recognition Act (chapter 19). Schedule 2.1 of the Constitution provides for
the recognition of custom unless it is inconsistent with a constitutional law
or statute or repugnant to the principles of humanity. Under section 3 of the
Customs Recognition Act, a custom is recognised provided that its practice
would not result in some injustice or would not be in the public interest.
Under section 5 of the same Act, the Courts are permitted to take custom
into account where justice requires it or where the failure to take it into
account would create an injustice. Thus, Bredmeyer J was able to
acknowledge the custom of compensation provided that its practice was in
the public interest, was not repugnant to the principles of humanity and was
in the general interests of justice.
The evidence given concerning custom in the Wahgi area revealed that it
had two purposes. First, it aimed at easing the tensions created by the injury
to the plaintiffs and to restore peace, harmony and good relationships
between the two clans. The second purpose was to avoid retribution or
“payback” from the victim’s clan.Bredmeyer J was of the view that the aim
of restoring harmony and good relationships between the two clans was in
accordance with the general principles of humanity. The purpose of avoiding
payback was not. He was prepared to emphasise the purpose of restoring
good relationships and therefore recognise the custom of compensation. The
next step was to determine how the Court should decide the damages to be
awarded less the compensation paid directly to them. In other words the
Court only took account of the compensation that the plaintiffs held
themselves and not that which was distributed to the wider clan. The
57 Supra note 17, at 355.
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purpose of this was to discourage customary payments in situations where
common law damages could be obtained.58
While Bredmeyer J was trying to avoid unjust enrichment his reasoning
evokes two responses and observations. First, compensation is central to
Highlands custom and it is one of the most important methods of avoiding
tribal fights when tensions emerge between clans. A custom fulfilling that
role should not be discouraged. Secondly, it could be argued that common
law damages and customary compensation perform two different yet
complementary roles. Traditional compensation focuses on inter-tribal
dynamics and tensions which arise as the result of an injury or death. The
purpose is to restore harmony and good relationships. The focus is therefore
on the group and not the individual. The focus of common law damages is
however on the individual plaintiff and aims at providing him or her with
the means of being in the same living situation that he or she would have
been in had the injury or death of a spouse not occurred. The focus on group
dynamics on the one hand and the needs of the individual on the other, if
applied properly, can combine and address the tensions, sufferings and
disabilities created by the civil wrong. Why not allow the awards of
compensation and damages to do this and complement each other without
reducing the common law damages by the amount of compensation paid
directly to the plaintiff? Since the largest amount of compensation is
distributed to the wider clan members, this could hardly be said to amount to
unjust enrichment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Considering the approach of the Courts as a whole it is safe to say that the
courts have achieved two things. First, they have moulded the award of
damages to meet the local circumstances and lifestyles of the plaintiffs
directly affected. Secondly, the Courts have broken new ground in the
manner in which damages ought to be awarded. While this approach needs
to be developed further, it can be said that the Papua New Guinea Courts
have made a significant contribution to the award of damages in Papua New
Guinea. Some of the unique sections of the Constitution of Papua New
Guinea has helped the Courts to do this.
In conclusion, five matters are raised to which the Courts need to give
greater attention. First, more attention needs to be given to the additional
severity that an injury can have upon a person who is dependent upon the
use of his hands or legs to obtain a subsistence living, and this needs to be
58 Supra note 17, at 362-363.
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recognised in the award of damages. Secondly, the Courts need to reconsider
the life expectancy of village people. At the moment they have set it at 55.
Given the increased life expectancy in the country generally, it is suggested
that this should be increased to 60 years of age. Thirdly, if an award of
solatium can be made to parents for the loss of a child, a similar award could
be made to a child under a certain age for the loss of a parent. Fourthly, the
Courts need to consider the extension of the use of section 155 (4) of the
Constitution when determining the appropriate method of the payment of
damages. One of the possible extensions of this section would be to order
the ongoing supervision of a village person who is fully paralysed as the
result of an accident to ensure that the orders of the court are achieving what
they are supposed to achieve. Finally, the Courts need to consider the
establishment of a trust in certain circumstances to ensure that money
provided as damages is protected from excessive and unreasonable demands
of relatives.
It is only through making such orders that Woods J’s claim, that the Courts
have a responsibility to consider the future needs and interests of the
plaintiff and ensure that he or she is properly cared for, can be fully realised.
The goal of appropriate awards of damages to people living a part-
subsistence village liefestyle in Papua New Guinea will continue to rely
upon the shared contribution of counsel and the judiciary in Papua New
Guinea.
